

[A Debate between Gordon H. Clark and David Hoover on epistemology (1:51:06) - Conducted April 9, 1983]

Introduction on the audiotape: The following debate between Dr. Gordon H. Clark and Professor David Hoover took place in the Spring of 1983 at Covenant College, Lookout Mountain, Tennessee. The debate discusses two approaches to Christian apologetics. Dr. Clark defends presuppositionalism while Mr. Hoover defends evidentialism or empiricism.

Gordon Clark:

...it is to become perfectly disgusted with sensation, to stand here in these ?? ?? ??

Audience laughter

Clark: Ordinarily when two philosophers contend for their positions, either in debate or in their publications, they begin with a refutation of the opponent's views in order to clear the ground for an exposition of their own. Descartes did this on his discourse on method where he described his traditional, inadequate, and untrustworthy education. Locke devoted book one of his four books on human understanding to a refutation of the theory of innate ideas. He described three or four forms of this doctrine and belabored them each with vigor. Similarly, the first four chapters of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* destroy Kant. After thus disposing of the opposition, these men constructively expounded their own philosophies.

By in large the negative argument is called an *argumentum ad hominem*. They are based on one of the opponent's assertions it argues to a conclusion he is unwilling to accept. Whether somewhat disguised or not, it convicts the opponent of self-contradiction. In geometry the argument goes by the name of a *reductio ad absurdum*. To demonstrate a theorem, the geometer assumes its contradictory and then proves its absurdity. Then the desired theorem is established.

This customary procedure is the one I have usually followed. In my book on *Behaviorism and Christianity*, the behaviorism comes first. I try to show that if behaviorism is true, it proves its own premises to be false. Similarly, *Historiography, Secular and Religious* begins with the secular view. *My Language and Theology* proceeds on the same general pattern. Only after 130 pages on Russell's logic, the logical positivist protocol sentences, and other associated theories, do I undertake an exposition of a theistic view of language.

But, for a change, and because many in this audience have heard my arguments against empiricism, I shall this evening begin with my own position based on Scripture.

Since the aim is to construct a Scriptural theory of epistemology, the first positive, non-ad hominem argument, will appeal to the Biblical declarations in Genesis 1, verses 26 and 27 and chapter 2 verse 7 that God created man in his own image. Some of the wording is, "And God

said, 'let us make man in our image.' So God created man in his own image. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life."

These Old Testament verses do not explicitly state the full impact of what happened. What happened the New Testament explains in greater detail. The words in Genesis, and as discussed in some theological publications, might give the impression that God, after creating Adam, put the image somewhere inside or upon the man. But the apostle Paul shows that God did not simply create man and stamp his image upon him. In 2nd Corinthians 11:7, Paul gives a more complete explanation. He does not say that the image is *in* man, he says that man *is* the image. The text declares that "man is the image and glory of God."

The nature of this image, that is the nature of man himself, must now be determined. What was man's condition as he came from the hands of his maker? Genesis not entirely silent on this matter. Indeed, Genesis says more than speed-readers can see. The first, but by no means the most important point, is that God gave Adam dominion over all living beings, fish, birds, and animals. But, though the fact of dominion in itself is not very important, the entailment of certain abilities essential for such dominion is very important for the confrontation between empiricism and apriorism. To dominate animals, a man requires a modicum of intelligence. Now it is hard to attribute even a modicum of intelligence to a blank mind. This becomes clearly in what follows.

As indicated, more important than the dominion over animals, is the fact that God explained this dominion to Adam. That is to say, God spoke to Adam and Adam understood what God told him. Genesis 1:28-30 says in brief "God said unto them 'be fruitful and multiply. Have dominion over every living thing that moveth over the earth.'" Adam understood these directions. And to understand what God says requires as much as or even more intelligence than it does to manage lions and mules.

The divine instructions, however, were not limited to agriculture and husbandry. The Lord gave Adam some religious instruction also. Genesis 2:16-17 records certain commands that God imposed on Adam. In particular, he commanded him not to eat the fruit of a certain tree and warned him that "in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Here we have a stated penalty for disobedience. Adam understood this command and this penalty for in 1 Timothy 2:14 it tells us that, though Eve was deceived, Adam was not deceived. Clearly Adam understood. But let us also understand that there is an important difference between understanding agriculture and understanding the idea of moral law. Since it will be a particular embarrassment to empiricism, the theme is worth developing.

[Audience laughter.]

One must therefore consider what is requisite to Adam's disobedience. In addition to understanding his dominion over animals, and in addition to his perhaps incomplete understanding of the creation of Eve as stated in Genesis 1:23 and 24, Adam also recognized his friendly and happy relationship with God. This is partly shown in the fact that neither Adam nor Eve was ashamed of being naked. It is better shown in the reported conversations between

God and Adam. The whole account in the first 2 chapters of Genesis depicts an unspoiled relationship. This relationship, which one may call a religious relationship, continues in a negative fashion after Adam's sin. The conversation is recording in Genesis 3:8-19. When Adam heard the voice of the Lord God, he and his wife hid themselves. And God said 'Where art thou?' Adam replied, I wasn't ready."And so the account proceeds. The important point, at least for the present purpose, is that God and Adam talk to each other and Adam understood.

Now in opposition to empiricism, I submit that none of this could have happened if Adam had to depend on sensation to get the least bit of knowledge. Thomas Aquinas thought that man's mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*. Neither Aristotle nor John Locke used the Latin phrase, but both philosophers insisted originally man's mind is a blank.

After refuting the doctrine of innate ideas in book 1, Locke in book 2, paragraph 2, very clearly asserts that man is born without any ideas at all. "Men must then suppose to the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge?" To this I answer, the guy here of course is John Locke, to this I answer in one word, "from experience in that all our knowledge is founded and from that it ultimately derives itself."

On the face of it, Locke and Genesis do not agree. And below the surface, there are strata to be understood by others one by one. The first is language itself.

The dominant scientific view today explains language as requiring language a million years or so of development from animal grunts and squeals. Adam lived about 900 years, not a million, and even if the account does not say explicitly that God spoke to Adam within three seconds of his creation, such is the impression nevertheless.

Before evolution captured the allegiance of the public, Rousseau is tempted to give a non-theistic theory of language. He discovered a trap from which he could not extricate himself. In his attempt to make language a social product, he was confronted with the puzzle that without language there could be no society. Well at least he recognize that he was stymied.

Now to proceed, language has several functions. That is, it can express various types of ideas. If animals cannot understand ordinary narrative, all the less do they understand moral command. They can be trained to obey certain sounds, but they have no consciousness of right and wrong. They cannot sin because sinning presupposes an understanding of the divine commands. Adam understood these commands, for as just stated, he was not deceived. The capacity for recognizing moral responsibility is beyond that of a finite mind. It is even beyond whatever instruction sensory experience could possibly have. Observational data, if there be any such, never implies a distinctions between moral good and evil. And the very best one might learn that such and such is the case, but one can never so learn that such and such ought to be the case. It is noteworthy that one of the most determined groups of anti-Christian

philosophers, namely the Logical Positivists, admit this and insist on it with glee. Morality is simply irrational personal preference.

But surely the most conclusive argument from Genesis center in the word image itself. If Adam was the image of God, he could not have had a blank mind for the simple reason that God's mind is not a blank.

This idea is of course repeated in other books besides Genesis. Even empiricists, if they are Christians, acknowledge that God is omniscient "the Lord is a God of knowledge." "Christ is the truth and wisdom of God." And certainly it is not necessary to quote a thousand pages of Charnock to prove the point. Because of this, Lock white sheet of paper and the *tabula rasa* of Aquinas cannot be the image of God.

The account in Genesis so clearly refutes empiricism that nothing further is logically needed. But the Bible provides additional details. What is implied in Genesis is expanded in Ephesians 4:24 and Colossians 3:10. These two passages, in explaining regeneration as a sort of new creation, teach that man was originally created in knowledge and in righteousness. In the preceding exposition here, both of their fact have appeared. If anything has been left implicit, it is that righteousness depends on knowledge. Knowledge is basic. One cannot obey a command, unless one first understands it.

All in all the conclusion seems inescapable, that Christianity and empiricism are completely incompatible. Nothing further is needed.

Nevertheless with these exegetical deductions from Scripture providing the positive side of the argument, the introductory paragraphs of this lecture had promised to put some negative arguments in second place. The aim is to show that empiricism is self-contradictory. Even so, the first contention can also appeal to Scripture and hence one can classify either way.

Empiricism insists that science is totally observation. Professor A. J. Carlson of Chicago, in a twice-published article, asks, "What is the method of science?" And he immediately answers, "In essence it is this - the rejection in toto of all non-observational and non-experimental authority in the field of experience." Similar sentiments can be found in other scientific writings. But if Carlson and others think that science arrives at truth, as they surely do think, it is easy to refute them.

Scientific laws are promulgated as universal propositions. The law of the pendulum is supposed to describe the motion of every pendulum past, present, and future. Light is supposed to travel always at the speed of 186,000 miles a second. But since these laws are universal propositions, no amount of observation demonstrates their truth. Observation is always observation of a miniscule proportion of the phenomena. Even if these few instances were correctly measured, as they never are, they do not imply any universal law of physics.

Another argument concerns one of the delusions of sensory experience. Presumably everyone, at least usually, sees a body as continuous and solid. One end of a pencil is firmly attached to the other end. But contemporary science insists that there is no connection between any two parts of the pencil. The distance between one end and the other is 99% empty space. This is a case of one set of sensations contradicting another set. They cannot both be correct. But who can tell which is which?

Delusions of sense deceive us dozens of times every day. They ought to condemn empiricists to despondency. Nearly any elementary textbook on perception will give multiple multiples in its first chapter. Anyone who insistently asserts the reliability of sensation ought to consult an oculist. One of my favorite examples, from the university's psychology laboratory, is that of the rotating disk. Half black, half white with a few black squiggles, or at least seen as black and white, when rotated at a high speed, produces sensations of red, blue, green and assorted shades. Or, for a less academic example, any competent landscape artist will tell you that the colors of a scene are disturbingly altered with a half-hour. But empiricism faces something much more disturbing and fundamental than these psychological peculiarities. It is the universal disparity between truth and error.

Logic teaches that there are precisely four forms of declarative sentences, in two pairs of contradictories. The two statements, 'Some dogs are gentle,' and 'No dogs are gentle,' cannot both be true and cannot both be false. The same relationship holds for 'All digits are even,' and, 'Some digits are not even.' We shall call this the law of contradiction. It should be obvious that if this law were false, intelligence, understanding, meaningful speech, and thinking itself, would be impossible. Gentle would mean vicious, odd would mean even, and everything would mean nothing.

Since Lutheran Theology has tended to be more empirical than aprioristic, a quotation from Dörner may be of some slight interest. In his System of Christian Doctrine (Vol. II, p. 82) he insists that "the soul is never a tabula rasa ... If in our knowledge there is already inherent no innate relation to what is rational and good — a relation that is an original dowry of our nature and not of our own work — then knowledge of truth and goodness as such is absolutely out of the question."

The law of contradiction is a universal proposition and can never be abstracted or deduced from experience. Most philosophers, in fact all but one, have never even attempted to describe its development. Aristotle did indeed offer an illustration, but he omitted to show how it illustrated anything. The attempt is vitiated from the beginning, for no one without the law of contradiction can even begin to learn. Yet Adam began to learn as soon as he was created. On the first day of his life he understood what God said. He understood because his mind had been created in that form. His mind was not a formless blank. Empiricism, on the contrary, is an impossible philosophy which a perspicuous Christian will replace with the innate, a priori image of God.

While the prevailing opinion today favors empiricism, even among Christians not to mention secularists, it was not always so. Origen in the third century, Gregory of Nyssa in the fourth century, and especially the great Augustine in the fifth century were by no means empiricists. From A.D. 400 to A.D. 1250 Augustinianism was dominant. More recently there was the Lutheran Dorner who we just quoted, and the Calvinist Shedd. There are also a few contemporaries who more or less consistently reject empiricism. Because of the paucity of great theologians at the present time, or perhaps because of the literary excellence of an earlier scholar, I wish to translate a page or two written by a post-reformation Augustinian. He did not always find what he was looking for, but he enthusiastically understood The Search for Truth.

“The spirit of man is by its nature placed between its Creator and bodily creatures ... But as the great elevation by which it is above all material things does not prevent it from being united to them ... so the infinite distance between the sovereign Being and the human spirit does not prevent it from being immediately united to him in a most intimate matter. This latter union elevates it above all things; by that union it receives its life, its light, and all its felicity . . . On the contrary, the union of the spirit with the body abases man infinitely, and it is now the principal cause of all our errors and all our miseries miseries.”

“I am not surprised that ordinary people or pagan philosophers only consider the soul in its relation to and union with the body, without recognizing the relation and union it has with God; but I am surprised that Christian philosophers, who ought to prefer the spirit of God above the spirit of man, Moses above Aristotle, Augustine above some miserable commentator of a pagan philosopher, are more interested in the soul as the form of the body than as made in the image and for the image of God ... to whom it is immediately united ... “

“... Since the will of God regulates the nature of everything, it is more the nature of the soul to be united to God by a knowledge of the truth and by the love of good, than to be united to the body, because it is certain ... that God made our spirits in order to know him and to love him rather than to impose a form on the body...”

The sin of the first man so weakened the union of our spirit with God that ... that union appears imaginary to those who blindly

[Transcriptionist note - Clark mistakenly skips page 33 in his hand-written notes prepared for thee debate. The page contains three other quotes. By skipping the page in the debate he incorrectly merges the end of a quote on page 34 to the quote he was giving on page 32. Page 33 of his hand-written notes prepared for this debate provide the missing material:

“On the contrary, it the first sin has so strengthened the union of our soul with our body that it seems to us that these two parts of ourselves are no more than a single substance; or, rather, it has so subjected us to our senses and our emotions that we are brought to believe that our body is the principal one of hte two parts of which we are composed.”

“The soul, although united very strictly to the body, does not cease being united to God; and at the very time when it is receiving from its body those feelings, lively and confused, which its passions inspire in it, it is [also] receiving from the eternal truth which presides over its spirit the knowledge of its duty and its shortcomings. When the body deceives it, God undeceives it. ...”
“... A man who judges everything by his senses, who always follows the movements of his passions, who perceives only what he senses ... is in the most miserable state of spirit that he could be in; ... but when a man judges things only by the pure ideas of the spirit, and carefully avoids the confused noise of the creatures, and when retiring into himself he hears his sovereign Maker, with his senses and passions silent, it is impossible for him to fall into error.”

“... but when the spirit turns from God and goes outside, when he interrogates only his body in seeking the truth, when he listens]

only to his senses, his imagination, and his passions, it is impossible for him to escape deception ...”

“The body fills the spirit with such a great number of sensations that it becomes incapable of knowing the least hidden of truths. ... It is only by the attention of this spirit that any truth is discovered and any knowledge is gained; because indeed the attention of the spirit is nothing other than its return and conversion to God, who is our only Teacher ... as St. Augustine says.”

[transition at 26:27]

David Hoover:

This is titled varieties of presuppositionalism. What I'd like to exhibit in my opening statement is not so much a philosophical statement or a theory of reasoning, but a clarification of issues where work remains to be done in apologetics. As will become evident, I do indeed hold the outline of the position in the sense that I buy the theory of what it means give reasons for the truth of Christianity must include several important truths regarding the uniquely human modes of assimilating and processing information about God's world. Man as a learner, an acquirer of knowledge of self, the world, and God cannot be lost sight of without risking obscurity and irrelevance in apologetics.

It has become my growing concern that the spirit of irrelevance is precisely what we've got in a great deal of the apologetic literature of the past 50 years. The blanket labels of presuppositionalism and evidentialism in their historical roles might not be two distinct apologetic methodologies seem to me not to be very informative. They serve more to arouse the ?? fervor ??? classmates at seminary and to keep the real vital issues obscure.

For example, presuppositional reasoning is said to be truth ??? reasoning while evidential reason is probabilistic reasoning, inherently uncertain. But one can certainly satisfy the logical requirements of reasoning presuppositionally without thereby reasoning from truth. Moreover, it certainly seems absurd to insist that evidence can never render a matter evidenced. As ???

revealed by ????. But the retort from the presuppositionalists is by now an old refrain and seems to shine ??? evidence, even to the evidentialist.

It goes something like this: it is a truism that a inductive argument cannot yield a conclusion whose truth is formally guaranteed. That is to say there is nothing in the form of the inductive argument whereby it is logically impossible for the conclusions be false if the premises are true.

Rather if the inductive arguments can be confided at all, they are said to contain premises which support rather than entail their validities. It doesn't seem the any inductively supported conclusion no matter how persuasive ?? could have ?? as much as possible because that at best any conclusion is only probable. But more stringently it would also seem to follow that ??? the inductive arguer ??? apologete must always be prepared to admit in view of the evidence, it is possible to be mistaken in his conclusion or that his conclusion is possibly false.

I think evidential apologetes, even from the caliber of B.B. Warfield or a John W. Montgomery are often taken in by this line of thinking. They shouldn't be. They appreciate of evidence need not be conceded to being exclusively formal ??? That is to say, It can be maintained that there is an inherent informality to evidence appreciation. An informality which ultimately exists ??? descriptive formalization in argument.

No empirical fact can be logical or formally guaranteed. But this is not because there are no empirical facts. It is because there are conceptual limitations to the capacity of human beings to formalize his empirically acquired knowledge ???. And this is not to say that logic itself is defective in some way. My contention is only that a human being lacks the capacity to completely translate the regular perceptions, that is true perceptions, of God's world discursively ??? his word.

It will take a complete description and a ?? understanding of all ??? data also in complete discursive translation to logically guarantee any claim to veridical perception. That we cannot do this does not entail that we cannot perceptually discriminate objects in God's world. Although perception is notoriously fallible, I somehow fail to see why ???

??? Anselm ??? Anselm ??? as my colleague maintained.

Although perception is notoriously fallible, it is mistaken to insist that a ??? negative argument, a probability ??? other considerations, the perceptual claim involved itself is inherently uncertain or possibly false. The claim can in fact be true into whatever extent people formally and informally appreciate the ??? ??? premise of the argument.

For example, my claim to veridically perceive my colleague sitting here in the debate here with me, cannot be logically guaranteed. The best argument that could be produced out of my claim would be in a formal sense, would be logically inconclusive. It is impossible for me to produce

premise complete deductively valid argument in the sense of a radically completed formalization that my colleague is here in this room before this audience in front of us.

?? inherently uncertain? not at all. That fact that that it is logically appropriate to assign a probability value to the conclusion of my best argument, neither implies that I am ignorant nor that it is uncertain that perceptions ???

So I began by complaining that the informative value of traditional labels presuppositionalism and evidentialism ??? without informative value.

Let me illustrate. There is no Christian thinker so far as I know, not even John Warwick Montgomery who believes a Christian can begin reasoning from epistemic abstraction. ??? there is unanimous agreement, I think, that one necessarily begins with something you cannot prove.

In this sense there are no non-presuppositionalists, there are only varieties of presuppositionalism. Montgomery, for example, ??? avoid metaphysical presuppositions. One cannot do without what he terms heuristic presuppositions, or presuppositions of methodology.

In *Where is History Going*, page 179, Montgomery first states that, states this as ground of his apologetic efforts. That is, he only adopts heuristic presuppositions not methodological ones. But then strictly violates this ??? presuppositions of content, by assuming, but not reckoning, a fundamental metaphysical distinction between historiography ??? and actual history. I suppose I could ask the question, Where is Montgomery going?

But my quite modest objection ??? in a straight-forward sense is a presuppositionalist. I take this ??? ??? Consider Van Til who is equally as famous as Gordon Clark as a presuppositionalist. Van Til wrote the book, one might say. ??? something to say on this book.

Between Gordon Clark and Cornelius Van Til there is a stark contrast between ??? and perceptual inquiry of evidence.

Where Clark denies the possibility of cognitive sensuous activity on purely logical grounds, there is no way to develop, to logically develop sensations to cognition, I agree with them on that, Van Til endorses ??? that man can inductively acquire knowledge of God's world. Indeed the very structure of Van Til's presuppositionalism requires that ??? such as our ability to ??? sensory perception is a vehicle of knowledge of a very curious sort ???. To see this clearly we only need to attend to Van Til's attitude to inductive slang and the relation between inductive slang and the Christian's presuppositions. States Van Til, this is a quotation from *The Defense of the Faith* "??? the God of Christian theism and ??? counsel as controlling all things in the universe ??? the only ??? that account for the uniformity of nature ??? But the best and only possible ??? for the existence of such a god is that is ??? required for the ??? coherence of all things in the world.

Notice that the world above all else, must be accounted for is the world of the scientists, the world which the scientists can make out by their methods. This world, implies Van Til, is such that by the scientists method be both uniform and coherent. But, however, none of this is a fatal concession to empiricism and go against the very logical heart of presuppositionalism's case.

Van Til's presuppositionalism serves to account for, explain the scientist's world. But which scientist, in terms of which philosophy of science? Science according to Galileo, Newton or

meaning according to Hume, Locke, Kant, Popper, etc.

Van Til's presupposition is that the propositions of the Christian faith function as a foundation about the world. But, Van Til's presupposition is the truth of Christianity is not empirical science. He does come consistently starting with the Christian presupposition in virtue of his structure between what he explains by this world and that which does the explaining, the Christian presupposition. Van Til is not a tacit evidentialist. The point is that for a perfect explanation of Newtonian mechanics can logically rise above the probability of empirical science corresponding to the Christian presupposition.

Clark avoids this ironic twist in Van Til's position by a categorical refusal of empirically acquired knowledge. He says that the only presuppositionalist is Van Til. We'll see more of that later. Two illustrations. Montgomery a presuppositionalist and Van Til an evidentialist? Surely, I must be wrong. Van Til presupposes, in order to account for the world of experience, while Montgomery finds presuppositions both heuristic and evidential in the enterprise of empirical science. Van Til's Christian presupposition fits historical facts and now we see that the Christian presupposition and the empirical fit.

Anything apart from the content of what is presupposed, presuppositional reasoning means may be said to first of all be a presupposition and an ambiguous part of reasoning that is evidence as well as a presupposition radically different from the content of what is presupposed.

And secondly, presuppositional reasoning is not a factually false account of reality without losing logical consistency. It is not a presupposition among, say, Anselm, Clark, and Van Til. The reason Van Til is not a presuppositionalist like Clark and Anselm is that I'm not sure they come out with any conclusion. The answer for the question, I think, is two fold. First, the point or purpose of presupposing is different than the point of presupposing. Secondly, the way a presupposition may logically facilitate cannot be separated from our metaphysical commitments to the existence of things which are acknowledged to exist and the relations between things over time as well. The point of purpose for presupposing is not to prove. Why do we suppose in the first place? First, we can't prove. Our reasoning must begin with what we cannot prove, both heuristically and evidentially. Our reasoning must begin, excuse me, to start reasoning on the basis of metaphysical content, but we must presuppose God, and content is not a presupposition. If one begins with no content, one does not begin. So to begin is not to prove. But why do we suppose a particular content, why this content rather than that?

It seems to me that one might put an emphasis here on content that is true. ??? if only one eternal truth is known, skepticism ??? ??? ??? So if one's main apologetic interest is to defeat skepticism, while interest in ??? Christians ??? might ??? ??? if that content is true. On the other hand one's primary interest might be to account for a range of data already believed to be true. For example, the uniformity and coherence of the universe. In that case, presuppositional content is valued primarily for its explanatory power. The question did arise ??? the nature of objects of knowledge. What sort of particulars are in need of explanation? Which ones do we admit, and how do they account for them?

It needs to be stressed that a commitment to the natures of these particulars is an essential part of what one begins with, an essential part then of one's presuppositions. If, for example, one acknowledges only propositions as ??? then the nature of propositions ??? know anything about them. Propositions are not the sort of thing which ??? another particular sort ??? Propositions have a cohesion by ??? ???

If there are no propositions, then there is no ??? ??? here ??? cohesion, that is implied by ??? thinking ??? An example ??? axiom of something like that

[minutes 42:00 to 55:00 of David Hoover's presentation are too poor in audio to transcribe.]

Moderator: Thank you very much. We're going to reset now for just ten minutes and then come back here for rebuttal.

Moderator: This is the second round. We've gone, in the first round, the statements, first Dr. Clark spoke and then Mr. Hoover. We're going to ask Dr. Clark when he gets here in a second with a rebuttal. Dr. Clark.

[transition at 55:37]

Gordon Clark:

By a very accurate count, there are 762 points of Mr. Hoover's speech which I must refute.

[Audience laughter]

There is one point on which I wish to commend him. Somewhere along the line he gave a definition of the word "fact." He used the word "fact" many many times you will remember. Unfortunately I never heard his definition before and having heard it only once, I have not had time to examine it, go through its implications. I do wish to remark, however, in Cohen and Nagel's logic, the book on the principles of logic of whatever title is, Cohen and Nagel give five or six different definitions of fact because the word is very ambiguous and different people use it in different ways. Hence maybe you will permit to define facts the way I prefer and it's not any one of the five or six that Cohen and Nagel mention, nor is it the one that I heard this evening.

But my definition of fact is a value with a variable error of zero. But this requires a certain knowledge of physics. And I recommend to all students that they take 2 or 3 courses in physics, because physics is so important for theology.

[Audience Laughter]

Now that is true. Here I have a part of a paper that was sent to me only about a week ago and it has to do with science and in bold letters here it says "SCIENCE CONTAINS NO TRUTH."

One of my objections to empiricism is that the major, at least the major form, the major triumph of empiricism is physics. And if physics is never able to attain to any truth at all, it doesn't recommend any blank mind theory.

I have another thing, another paper here. Some time ago a gentleman wrote an article on my views, and tried to dismiss them on the basis that it is impossible to deduce mathematics from Scripture. And he thought the knowledge of mathematics was so important that if you couldn't deduce it from Scripture, then it's just too bad, you mustn't say that knowledge comes from Scripture. But, I have an article here, Math and the Bible, which shows how mathematics is deducible from Scripture. And would you know it, the author is J. C. Keister. I hope you ask him about it.

Now, furthermore, I wonder whether you would consider this point too. I mentioned that man is created in the image of God and therefore there was not originally a blank mind but a mind with a priori forms. Now animals were not created in the image of God. But I wonder how you would explain the Baltimore orioles. Have you ever thought of the Baltimore orioles? I don't mean the orioles in Baltimore, I mean the Baltimore orioles. But these birds you know have the ability to construct rather interesting nests. And I don't think you can explain the way they construct interesting nests as the result of gradual experience from a blank mind on to this type of architecture. So it seems to me not only does man have a priori knowledge to begin with but even the Baltimore orioles.

Now what were the other 761 points?

[audience laughter]

I think that's enough. Mr. Hoover will, can take the extra time that I don't need.

[audience laughter]

[Transition 1:01:01]

David Hoover:

I may very well do that.

I didn't count the errors in Dr. Clark's remarks. I'd like to say first off that I applaud his refutation of John Locke. John Locke needs refuting. I think Barkley and Hume as well. If I can speak up on what Dr. Clark was just talking about, let's think for a moment about innate ideas, or a priori forms. Structures that we have in our minds that allow us to presumably to do something. It allows the Baltimore orioles to construct these aesthetically satisfying nests. How can it do that? Do they have to discriminate twigs and debris of various sorts and then bring them back to a certain place and begin their construction? I'm glad that they know how to do that, but surely Baltimore is a complex place to be in, not that the orioles have to be in Baltimore. But how did they find these materials, and then how do they manage to apply their innate structures to the task at hand? I take it it is a certain time, maybe a certain summer, spring, or whenever they do these things, that they construct these nests. So, I'm impressed by the bird brains

[audience laughter]

I think Dr. Clark likes using "bird minds." I don't think he'll allow me the brain. But a bird mind. I'm in favor of them having pre-forms, structures which allows them to do these amazing things. It is maybe it is important to realize that they can't build them any other way. But the mockingbird apparently do things other ways. It can mock, I guess, other birds. I don't know enough about that to talk about it. Let's consider them as beginning structures, innate ideas. I'd like to draw attention to what Dr. Clark says in *A Christian View of Men and Things*.

I'd like to call attention first of all to the title of the book which I like very much. I want to have a Christian view of men and things. I want to have it, I mean. I'm glad that Adam had it. I'm glad that the Apostle Paul had a view, and a Christian view of men and things, but I'd like to have one too. And I'd like to be able to relate that to the men and things that I come in contact with. So if Dr. Clark will allow me to apply my structures, my innate forms to the things that are going on around me, then I don't mind. He says that, in fact he said very emphatically, that Adam was a learner. And ??? that, what does that mean? ??? of God. What does it mean that Adam learned? Does it mean that Adam could acquire, in virtue of an endowment he was given, knowledge of God's world. He was placed in the world, and my contention is that Adam is epistemically or noetically suited to the world God placed him in, and the same would go for us.

??? need to understand this. Going to a Christian view of men and things, ??? a chapter on epistemology, a section that critiques Kant. Dr. Clark does a very nice job on Kant and I would also applaud that, Kant refuting. Anthropocentric, I can't pronounce that right now, a priorism, I think, does lead to solipsism. But Kant did have a good idea, we do need to be able to structure, we need to be able to put things together. Intelligence requires something, the tabula rasa is not something I want to defend at all.

Then what does Dr. Clark say in "A Christian View of Men and Things" in virtue of which we can use Kant's particular kind of a priorism but nevertheless have an a priorism which will serve us

in God's world, so we can be stewards in it. So we can notice the poor people, so we can notice things which need to be done, and do God's word.

Well, Dr. Clark draws attention to a view which is briefly stated by Kant, but then dismissed, dismissed by very bad reasons. And the view that Kant briefly considers but then dismisses is called preformationism. I went through the trouble of rereading that when I read Dr. Clark's book. Rereading that *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant should not have dismissed preformationism, and I agree with that. What is preformationism? The preformational doctrine that I think is very good, is that God has preformed us, he has given us an intellectual ability, capacity, intellectual dispositions, theological, how to distinguish between a capacity and a disposition. Dispositions will be exercised if you are exposed to something rather, then you will behave in that manner if the conditions are right. A capacity may or may not be exercised. But I think there are a number of terms we need to sort out and distinguish. But I think we have intellectual structures, and I'm not sure how to go about defining them, but Clark doesn't really want to go into that either, at least in *A Christian View of Men and Things*.

He says some sort of preformationism must be true if we are to avoid skepticism. And ??? skepticism, and I agree. The question I'd address to Dr. Clark then, if we can use time in this way. I'm not sure if I'm using, the lights here are telling me what time it is. Is his preformationism, or what he recommends in his *A Christian View of Men and Things*, is that a doctrine that will allow us to consider that we have the ability to discriminate objects, men and things, in the world here now? Can I ask that question?

Gordon Clark: Yes you may. Let me hear the question first.

David Hoover: The question that I have is, I'm trying to understand your doctrine, or your, the view that you favor when you think about Kant's preformationism. And I like what you have to say about preformationism, and I think that the Baltimore orioles are preformed in ways which allow them to build a nest. And I think we're in ways that allow us to the things we need to do. And for the Christian we can have a view of men and things which is biblically appropriate. But the question is, does preformationism in your view allow us to discriminate objects in God's world? Can I see you?

Gordon Clark: An object in God's world in my position is a proposition. It is not a collection of disjointed sensations.

David Hoover: Well, ok. I am preformed to discern propositions.

Gordon Clark: Yes.

[Audience Laughter]

David Hoover: Can I learn new ones? Ones that I didn't know before.

Gordon Clark: If you can validly deduce them from the axioms, yes.

David Hoover: It may be raining outside, and suppose that I agree with you that we're dealing with propositions exclusively, and I'll assert the proposition at a time later than now, further along in the story anyway, that the proposition "It is raining outside Carter Hall" ok will be either true or false. I don't know whether it is true or false, and I don't think I will come to a conclusion on that by deducing it from an axiom.

Gordon Clark: No, I don't think so either.

David Hoover: Well, then it is impossible for me to ever have knowledge of that sort?

Gordon Clark: Yes, it is impossible because you never know whether you're having an hallucination or your sensation are incorrect, or whether you even have a sensation.

David Hoover: Well, I'm agreeing with you about the propositions, and I'm asking you about the truth value of the proposition if "it is raining outside Carter Hall" at a certain point.

Gordon Clark: I didn't say that you could deduce any proposition. It must be validly deduced from the axioms. And the axioms are the of Scripture.

David Hoover: Did Noah deduce that it began to rain?

Gordon Clark: I wasn't there. I don't know.

[Audience Laughter]

David Hoover: You don't get that impression when you read Genesis 6. I have never really deduced anything of that sort. Perhaps I have never known anything.

Gordon Clark: I have never deduced that either.

David Hoover: Alright. Well, if I can't tell whether it is raining, God has not endowed me, ??? ever rained, never known that sort of thing. Have I ever known whether, for example, I have stood in the middle of a soccer field? On a given day. I'm not giving you the exact coordinates of the place I stood, but.

Gordon Clark: If you give the place of the coordinates of the places you are assuming a certain view of science which I say cannot be substantiated.

David Hoover: So that, no one has ever stood in a soccer field?

Gordon Clark: No that doesn't bother me, it simply means you don't know whether or not, because you may be dreaming, you may have hallucinations. You may be mistaken for a number of different reasons.

David Hoover: Ok, those thing I'm, those are the sort of things I'm very sure about. I'm very sure that I'm on a platform right now.

Gordon Clark: You are sure of things when you're dreaming too.

David Hoover: No I'm not.

[Audience Laughter]

Gordon Clark: I thought most people were.

David Hoover: No, I think you'd have to make an exhaustive induction and see whether most people have certainty or lack of certainty. My dreams don't have that feature.

Gordon Clark: Well, I don't dream very often. Once in a while. You can ask the audience if you wish whether they don't think they're facing reality when actually they're dreaming. How do they distinguish between dreaming and not dreaming?

David Hoover: In my awoken state I don't think I'm an expert on my dream state. But when I'm dreaming...

Gordon Clark: When I'm dreaming you're very sure things are so.

David Hoover: No, I'm not.

Gordon Clark: Well then, you're very queer.

[Audience Laughter]

David Hoover. Q.E.D.

[Audience Laughter]

Gordon Clark: Q.E.D.

David Hoover: Let's take up an issue you raised in the last chapter of *Language and Theology*. There you say that if, we can't just read our bible, that is a naive thing to begin with. I get the impression though, that it is a naive thing. And we are not to equate God's meanings with physical objects or with color sequences or so on.

Gordon Clark: No, I don't think that the doctrine of the Trinity is composed of red, yellow, blue, and green.

David Hoover: How about the revelation of the Trinity, what is that composed of?

Gordon Clark: Propositions.

David Hoover: And how do the propositions get across to me?

Gordon Clark: From God, by His impressing us with His truth.

David Hoover: Would he give that by revelation?

Gordon Clark: Doesn't the Scriptures say that the Spirit gives us the information? I can't quote the verse. You'll find it in 1st John somewhere. I forget just where it is, but you read 1st John. And in other places too. Maybe it is in Ephesians.

David Hoover: But that would be revelation from God by Scripture. I mean, why is Scripture, how is it the meaning of God is inscripturated? Is that a fair question?

Gordon Clark: I think you are begging the question. You would first have to show how black marks on a page can produce anything intelligible. You ought to define sensation, you ought to show how sensation produces perception, you ought to defend your theory of images, and try to construct abstract ideas out of images, and I think it cannot be done.

David Hoover: Ok. Are you saying that I cannot read unless I have an exhaustive analysis of what it means to read? I need to know what it means to read in order to read.

Gordon Clark: I want you to define sensation and how you get perception from it, how you get images from that when the Francis Galton shows that not all people have images. Then if you have images how in the world can you derive abstract ideas from them? Unless you explain that you have not met the point.

David Hoover: One of my problems is, what you've just said invokes inductively acquired knowledge.

Gordon Clark: Knowledge is not inductively acquired at all. Induction is always a fallacy.

David Hoover: Good, then the man that you just cited can not be relied upon as an authority.

Gordon Clark: Oh, you are an empiricist, and you have to accept his account of experience.

David Hoover: I already applauded your refutation of Locke. That was a refutation of empiricism, I don't feel refuted. But ...

Gordon Clark: Do you believe or do you assert that all people have images?

David Hoover: No.

Gordon Clark: Then how do you get abstract ideas?

David Hoover: I don't know.

Gordon Clark: Good. I don't think you can.

David Hoover: The fact that I don't know doesn't mean that I can't have them. The fact that I ...

Gordon Clark: The fact that you don't know means that you don't have a complete theory.

David Hoover: Yeah, what I would want to maintain though is my son Ryan or myself, or just take anyone. It is not necessary for them to what it means to see in order to be able to see. God can make me able to see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and feel without the analysis itself of what it means to be doing those things. The analysis isn't in yet. I'm waiting for the research. I don't claim to have the analysis.

Gordon Clark: Well then you can't defend your position.

David Hoover: Well, you can't say seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, so on is impossible or meaningless either.

Gordon Clark: I insist that any induction is a fallacy. From a limited number of instances you cannot derive a universal conclusion.

David Hoover: Yeah, that will go back earlier in the paper where I talk about the informal of discerning things. If you restrict discernment or knowing to that which can be exhaustively formalized, then you're correct. I don't hold that presupposition. It is an informal aspect.

Gordon Clark: That is a fallacy.

David Hoover: What is a fallacy?

Gordon Clark: The fallacy is stating a universal proposition on the basis of incomplete induction.

David Hoover: I didn't ask for an example of a fallacy, I asked the definition of a fallacy.

Gordon Clark: I just gave it to you. A fallacy is an inference whose conclusion is not true every time the forms of the premises are true. That's just the definition of validity.

David Hoover: Yeah, I would take a fallacy to be a mistake in reasoning.

Gordon Clark: Exactly, but I'm telling you what the mistake is. If you draw a conclusion which is not true every time the premises are true, it is an invalid inference.

David Hoover: Right, if deduction logic is the paradigm of all human reasoning, that is the paradigm we go by.

Gordon Clark: That is precisely reasoning. There isn't any other kind of logical or valid reasoning.

David Hoover: I'm going to use a whole lot of other kinds of reasoning as soon as this meeting is over.

Gordon Clark: Go ahead, it doesn't mean anything.

[Audience Laughter]

David Hoover: I think that the good Samaritan could have used your reasoning not to reach out and touch somebody. When he's going along the road, he saw the man who's bruised and battered. He could have reasoned that it is equal-probable whether or not there is anybody there.

Gordon Clark: Define probability.

David Hoover: No, I'm not going to do that yet.

Gordon Clark: That's the trouble isn't it.

David Hoover: No it's not the trouble. It's equal-probable whether or not there is anybody there, hence there is no reason why I should stop, no special reason to keep going either, I choose to keep going. Seems to me that he could obey God ...

Gordon Clark: Probability is the fraction of the favorable cases over the total number. And I don't think you can apply probability to the Samaritan and ???

David Hoover: Well it seems to me that if the injured Jew has to ??? discriminated by the Samaritan, he could have used reasoning of the sort you've given ???

Gordon Clark: You haven't shown that there is any probability at all.

David Hoover: Yeah, I would hold that probability is an expectation value.

Gordon Clark: Well people expect all sorts of things.

[pause in the recording 1:20:30]

Moderator: Well, I think probably there has been some ???

[audience laughter]

Moderator: And I suspect the questions will tend to focus, on the, I hope, on the major points ??? to arouse Dr. Clark's first speech with regard to his views with regard to empiricism and Adams knowledge, and being created in the image of God. And then the place where Dave Hoover begins with the idea that we are noetically fit and enabled by God, preformed, know, informally at least, the world that has been created. And I think that I would like to ask a question that I would like each of these gentlemen to answer and that is, what difference would it make in your apologetics approach, I know Dr. Clark is seeking to develop a system of apologetics, a system opposed to a philosophy, rather than just dealing with details about this or that instance, or this or that situation. But, in effect, what kind of difference does it make, your focus, in terms of how you would approach apologetics, how should the faith be defended, and then I would like to ask Dave Hoover's answer the same question, if that question is clear at all. I'm not sure that it is. Please don't ask me to define the terms.

[audience laughter]

Gordon Clark: I quite agree with something that the moderator just said, mainly that Christianity is a system of doctrine. It is not a haphazard aggregation of true propositions. These propositions form a system. And our ordination vows say that we accept the Westminster Confession as the system of doctrine contained in the Scriptures. The advantage of that, which I think Mr. Anderson has asked for, is that this gives us a method of replying to and refuting logical positivism and other non-Christian doctrines, which cannot be refuted by haphazard propositions even if they happen to be true. I think, is that a sufficient answer?

[20 sec break]

David Hoover: There are so many questions to begin.

Gordon Clark: 762

[Audience laughter]

David Hoover: I'd like to use my time to make a comment. *[missing sound]* I mean who are you going to refute? I believe there is somebody named Anthony Flew. I have an equal quarrel with the logical positivists. A. J. Ayer, I think, is worthy of reputation. He needs to be refuted, and can be refuted. Be HE cannot be refuted. HE is not mentioned in the Bible. He is not deducible in the system of doctrine ?? in Scripture. So what am I doing when I am refuting A. J. Ayer or Bertrand Russell or any other person who for all I know doesn't exist. And since I don't know as a refutor, or refuter, I guess, whether I exist, I think that the whole problem of apologetics becomes specious.

Gordon Clark: Mr. Hoover said doesn't know me, I agree. And the Scripture says the heart of man is even above measure, who can know it? Sorta implies nobody knows it, doesn't it? Furthermore, in the last sentence he used, he used the word existence. And I usually take time off to show that the word existence has no meaning. And the basis of that is: any predicate which can attach to every subject altogether has no meaning. Unless a predicate both includes and excludes something, it has no meaning. And when the predicate "existence" can attach to every subject whatever, and hence the word doesn't mean a thing. It's no use talking about it.

[audience laughter]

Gordon Clark: I thought the students were supposed to be ???

[audience laughter]

Davie Hoover: In ??? 50 or 54, St. Paul wrote ?? throughout ??? Cappadocia, anyways the ??/ of the Roman Empire that were located in modern day Turkey. And in Chapter 3 of that letter that was to be circulated, the letter's encyclical, he is not addressing academicians, theologians, philosophers. He's addressing saints scattered who are about to undergo persecution. He tells them to be ready, to be equipped, to have a reason, ????? for the hope that is in them. This is something that they could do. I take it that Peter addresses us also. ????? and that we can do, and are being enjoined to do, precisely what Peter told those saints scattered throughout those provinces. I can't make sense of that. ?????

Moderator: You had a question. The microphone is over here and if you have a question, we'd like you to approach the microphone and so that we all can, so that all of us can hear you.

Questioner: This is a very simple question. Please wait till I ask. You may be willing to applaud. Dr. Clark, maybe I can ask you a question. If seeing the tree of knowledge of good and evil is a prerequisite for the disobedience of eating, I may even say tasting, fruit. What is the nature of a tree, if not a spatio-temporal observable object? What is the nature of seeing, if not a sensory perception? How did Adam know that Eve did not give him the fruit of the tree of life rather than the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Or even possibly the bark of the tree in which the Baltimore oriole built it's nest?

[Audience laughter]

Gordon Clark: I am so glad that the students are beginning to take part.

[Audience laughter]

Gordon Clark: Adam's knowledge was partially his a priori equipment and besides that there were certain matters of information that God gave him when God spoke to him. He understood what God said because he was created with this logical form and this moral one too. And that is the way it was. Now as for the rest of us who suffer from the effects of sin, but even Adam himself, the gentlemen that just spoke talked about sensation, but he did not define sensation. He did not even show there was such a thing as sensation. And in my view, which I get from St. Augustine, there is no such thing as sensation. The people who try to use sensation don't usually define it. And they, I don't think, I know just one man, of course there may be others, but I know only can remember reading 1 book, any attempt to show how perception comes from sensation. And there's another 1 book, one 1 book, where the author has tried to show how images result in abstract ideas. And until these questions are answered, all these objections, in my opinion, are begging the question. They are assuming the things that need to be proved. And rather than go on with this more complicated thing, I think the basic principles that ought to be decided upon.

Questioner: ???/ redirect if I may. As you may have noticed Dr. Clark, I did not make any objections to your views. I make sure that I don't because I'm not getting involved in the debate because I think I'm going to be the loser. I asked a question, what in your estimation is the nature of a tree? And what is the nature of seeing, according to Scripture? And how did Adam know that Eve did not give him the fruit of the tree of life rather than the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. And how did he know?

Gordon Clark: God told him.

Questioner: How do you know? Did you deduce that from Scripture?

Gordon Clark: Yes, of course. The only way you can.

Questioner: Was it a logical deduction or a probable deduction?

Gordon Clark: There is no such thing as a probable deduction.

Questioner: Well if you say "the only way I can" this doesn't seem to be a deduction to me.

Gordon Clark: I beg your pardon?

Questioner: When you say that it is the only way it is possible that God told him, I cannot deduce that from Scripture by logical conclusiveness. It is a possibility from your point of view that God

did it that way, but it is not an absolute necessity under the basis of the words that were spoken in Scripture.

Gordon Clark: Well, I rather think it is.

Questioner: Rather think it is? Are you certain?

Gordon Clark: Well you read the Scripture and see, then you will come to your opinion.

Questioner: I wasn't objecting to you. I just asked you for your own terminology. You say you rather think it is, that is not good enough. On the basis of your own presuppositions.

Gordon Clark: My presupposition is that the Scripture is true. And if the Scripture teaches something then that is what we should accept.

Questioner: Right, if the Scripture teaches that Adam saw the tree, then I believe that Adam saw the tree.

Gordon Clark: What do you mean by saw?

Questioner: I asked you that question, first.

[audience laughter]

Gordon Clark: A tree, according to empiricism, is a combination of, oh a dozen or more sensations. Now, I try to say there is no such thing as sensation to begin with. But even if there were such things of sensation, I don't see how an empiricist can show why a person combines this group of sensations into a thing rather than make some other combination. And I have never heard an empiricist answer this question.

Questioner: Alright, I am not an empiricist, so I have no problem. But I want to ask you, what do you think the Scripture says a tree is?

Gordon Clark: Please say that again?

Questioner: What do say Scripture says is a tree is? And seeing is for that matter.

Gordon Clark: The Scripture doesn't say what a tree is, and I don't know what a tree is.

Questioner: But the Bible says there is such a thing as tree isn't that right?

Gordon Clark: ??? a botanist doesn't know ??? In fact botanists and zoologists can't tell the difference between plants and animals.

Questioner: So is there a tree? Is there a tree or not? In this picture.

Gordon Clark: You tell me what you mean by tree and I'll...

Questioner: No, no, no, that's.... I told him I'm not going to fall into that trap. If the Scripture says there is a tree, there is a tree.

Gordon Clark: That doesn't say what a tree is.

Questioner 1: I know. ??? I know. Well, I ask you for one redirect. And I think I didn't have 762, but I maybe have too many already.

Questioner 2: Dr. Clark, since we can't deduce from Scripture that we are human beings responsible to God, how can we be morally responsible? How are you ... how do you know that you are a human being responsible to God since you can't deduce from Scripture that you are a human being? And if you don't know that, how are you morally responsible? How can you be morally responsible?

Gordon Clark: In addition to what can be known by deduction, people have various opinions. They are not deduced. They may be chance be true, but we can't really know that they're true, because we haven't proved them. I have a vague opinion that maybe I am almost human, though people don't always think so. But if I am, then I am responsible for obeying the law of God. And I often try to, try to meet that responsibility but I fail considerably.

Questioner 3: If ?? the first commandment to till the ground, we admit that God made ground and that he made man to till it and hopefully gave him some kind of tools. You have to know what ground is. Man has to know in order to continue the command to take dominion over the earth. He has to continue to do things like till the ground. We haven't any reason, any way I should say to know what tilling is or what the ground is. We have no means by which we can be faithful to God.

Gordon Clark: Scientists don't even know what this is. We look at it and say it is solid. But scientists say it is not solid; they aren't any two particles in it that touch. We don't know what the ground is. Is the ground a combination of various sensations or what is it?

Questioner 3: Well there is no faithfulness then that we can ???

Gordon Clark: There's no what?

Questioner 3: We cannot be faithful to the word of God and thus ??? we can tell what the ground is.

Gordon Clark: Now that doesn't follow.

Questioner 3: I expect to lose big time here because ??? but

Gordon Clark: I'm sorry I have to hold my hand up, but I can't see you otherwise. In fact, I don't know whether I see you at all.

[audience laughter]

Questioner 3: I don't know if I oughta sit down after that. I don't understand how, there's a lot I don't understand, but I especially don't understand how it is possible to be faithful to the command to till the ground if Adam couldn't know what the ground was. Or, if we're supposed to have dominion over creation, I don't see that we can be faithful to that unless we can know what creation is. And we can't deduce that from Scripture. We're told that creation is there, but you don't know what a tree is, so you can't have dominion over it.

Gordon Clark: I don't see why you can't till the ground without knowing what the ground is. You can do things that you don't know anything about. You do them nonetheless. And as I say, scientists have no idea what the ground is. It's mostly empty space.

Questioner 3: I'm befuddled.

Gordon Clark: Now, let me, of course we josh a little bit, but I would like to make this point in all seriousness, and I, without trying to put you down. But what I think is needed is a good knowledge of physics and a philosophy of science. I mentioned the word "fact" a time ago. Then there is the analysis of laboratory experimentation which is not entirely based on observation because there are a great many factors that are used in the formation of a law of physics which are not observational. And furthermore, physics changes, I wish to inform you that everything they taught me in physics at the University of Pennsylvania is now nearly all discarded by all the scientists in the world. And I am very much persuaded, though I can't prove it logically, but it seems to be reasonable to suppose, that the science of today will be dropped by 10 years or so and very different theories will be accepted. So that the results of scientific observation give you different propositions as years go by. And this fellow who wrote to me and said that science is never true, I think is telling the truth. He realizes that science is tentative, as Plato said and it is not final as Aristotle said. Aristotle was an empiricists and Plato wasn't.

Questioner 4: Though the title of tonight's debate is "Presuppositionalism vs. Evidentialism," it appears it is more a presentation of ?? Gordon Clark ?? belief plus a critique of it, and that's all well and good. I would wonder if it is not fair to characterize the differences in view between Mr. Hoover and Dr. Clark as what we, how we characterize truth. Do we characterize it as something we cannot deny or is it something which is a good probable guess, but it is still

acceptable. Acceptable in the sight of God. Is this a fair characterization of the contrasting views?

Gordon Clark: No, I do not think so. You suggested first that truth might be something we cannot deny. And people deny all sorts of things. They deny a lot of truths. Truth is not something that people cannot deny. And what was your second suggestion?

Questioner 4: Whether or not we can accept, because we live in a created world, a world which we are endowed with the ability to understand and live in it. Whether a good probably guess would be acceptable in the sight of God to live in it.

Gordon Clark: Probability is the fraction of the affirmative cases over the total of affirmative and negative. I don't see how you can use probability in this argument.

Questioner 4: Sure, I'm not attempting to defend that. I'm just attempting to characterize the contrasting viewpoints. Whether or not you see truth as more of a structured, more of a narrow, in more of a narrow sense, in the sense that we can, it is something which we cannot deny. And that would how your axiomatic method would fit in that.

Gordon Clark: Lots of people deny the Scriptures. Of course truth can be denied. It's denied everyday.

Questioner 4: Mr. Hoover

David Hoover: Yeah I'd like to respond to something I heard Dr. Clark say and I really do believe I have it verbatim. I'm trusting my whatever for that. You said, I believe, sir, that one could till the ground with reference to Adam without knowing what the ground is. By parity of reason it seems, you should be able to accept this, that one can see a tree, in Adam's day as well as our own, without knowing what seeing is. That I can hear you without an analysis of what hearing is. Why not?

Gordon Clark: If you wish to assert that we can see a tree, that can be accepted in various senses. My trouble is that I don't know what you mean by see as well as I don't know what you mean by tree. I want a person who depends on experience to define what he means by sensation, and furthermore how sensation can produce perception, and how perception can produce images, and how images can produce abstract ideas such as tree. And unless this is done there is no system in what a person says.

David Hoover: It seems to rigidly follow from what you say that until we have the correct philosophical analysis of what it means to see, nobody can see. And that seems absurd.

Gordon Clark: If I knew what you meant by see it wouldn't seem absurd, I suppose. But I don't know what you mean by the word see.

David Hoover: I believe you, but I think there are a lot of people who do know what I mean by see.

Gordon Clark: Well, ask them to tell me.

David Hoover: I don't have an analysis of see which you would accept. Scripture talks about seeing. It talks about a lot of people in the Bible who manage to see things. See objects, tree, lots of different things. ?? and so on. Why do you deny that to us? Because we don't have a philosophical analysis of what it means to see.

Gordon Clark: The various philosophers and theologians, as undoubtedly you know, have had different theories of sensation. And until you pick out one of them and decide to defend it, the language is ambiguous and cannot be met.

David Hoover: I'm all in favor of the continuation of theorizing about the meaning of see, hear, smell, and the rest. And let that go on. But surely you can't deny that until that analysis is all in, nobody can see, hear, smell, taste, or touch. I mean those words are used in the Bible. Is that just gibberish. Are those just tags that we can't make any sense of?

Gordon Clark: There are a number of words in the Bible we do not understand. Or we may understand them in one way and that may be correct or not be correct. But if we're going to have a debate, we better understand the sense in which the words are used. And we cannot accept one apologetic rather than another unless the terms are unambiguously defined. And I would like to make one concluding remark, because I don't want to use the time. When Mr. Hoover speaks of a kind of knowledge other than truth, other than, and truth in my opinion is always a quality of propositions, I would like to say the truth of God is the sword of the spirit. Is is, truth is powerful. And something that is so vague, at least it seems vague to me when Mr. Hoover described it, is no substitute for the truth of God.